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Executive Summary 
 
 
The UK has been the theatre of a dramatic shift in the production of graduates; during the 
past decade the proportion of a cohort attending tertiary education has increased from less 
than 15% in 1985 to more than 33% 10 years later.  However, doubts have been raised 
whether the demand for graduates has kept up with the supply.  Furthermore, claims have 
been made that a large proportion of graduates are employed in “sub-graduate jobs”, that is 
graduates are over-educated for the tasks required to do their job.  Over-education would 
indicate that a tremendous amount of public money is wasted subsidising higher education.  
Thus, estimating the extent and effect of over-education is important, especially at a time 
when the debate on the financing of higher education is raging. 
Widening participation in education may lead to an increase in over-education for 
various reasons.  Employers faced by a more qualified pool of candidates may have upgraded 
some traditionally non-graduate jobs.  Alternatively they may recruit graduates for jobs that 
have basically stayed the same and do not require graduate skills, or as educational standards 
are commonly suspected to decrease over-time, upgrade their qualification requirements to 
select candidates with the appropriate skills.  Moreover, the increased participation in tertiary 
education has depleted the pool of well-qualified 16 year-old school leavers, thus employers 
may consider low ability graduates as an adequate substitute.  However, it is suspected that 
widening the access to higher education has increased the heterogeneity of the skills of the 
new graduates entering the labour market.  Hence, previous measures of over-education may 
have overestimated the true extent of the phenomenon, as some graduates are not endowed 
with the skills required to obtain a graduate job.  
After reviewing the literature on over-education, this paper proposes an alternative 
measure of over-education based on occupation and job satisfaction, more precisely, whether 
the graduate is satisfied with the match between her education and her occupation.  Graduates 
in a sub-graduate occupation who are satisfied are defined as apparently over-educated, 
whereas those who are dissatisfied are called genuinely over-educated. 
Apparently over-educated workers’ pay is 7% lower than that of matched graduates.  
The pay penalty reaches 33% for genuinely overeducated workers, which indicates that 
returns to a degree are nearly nil.  When including a measure of idiosyncratic skills, the pay 
differential disappears for the apparently over-educated workers and is dampened by up to 
40% for the genuinely over-educated.  This indicates that over-educated graduates mostly 
lack the skills allowing them to compete for graduate jobs.  Furthermore, the skill-gap 
between genuinely over-educated graduates and other graduates increases overtime as the 
former get less employer-training than other graduates.  Evidence on the lack of skills of 
some graduates opens the debate on the future of higher education.  Should more money be 
provided in order to increase the performance of students at risk of being over-educated or 
should the access to university be restricted and some alternative (shorter, vocational) tertiary 
qualifications created? 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A common government policy is to encourage participation in education.  The cornerstone of 
such policies lies in the belief that a more educated labour force leads to increased economic 
growth, (see Gemmel, 1996) for empirical evidence concerning the UK).  The reform of the 
university system in the UK in the beginning of the 1990s led to a dramatic shift in the 
production of graduates:  during the past decade the proportion of a cohort attending tertiary 
education has increased from less than 15% in 1985 to more than 33% 10 years later.  
However, doubts have risen whether the demand for graduates has kept up with the supply.  
Mason (1996), examining the recruitment of graduates in the UK financial industry in 1995, 
reports that as many as 45% of newly recruited graduates were employed in “non-
mainstream” graduate jobs.  Such a high degree of over-education would indicate that a 
tremendous amount of public money is wasted subsidising higher education.  Thus, 
estimating the extent and effect of over-education is important, especially at a time when the 
debate on the financing of higher education is raging (Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). 
The literature on over-education and its corollary, job-education mismatch, has 
recently received a renewed interest in Europe (Hartog, 1997), and especially in the UK, after 
reforms led to a large increase in student enrolment (Sloane et al., 1999; Dolton and 
Vignoles, 1997, 2000; Groot, 1996; Groot and Maasen van den Brink, 1997; Battu et al., 
1999; Green et al., 1999).  All mentioned studies conclude that over-educated workers have 
lower returns to their education1.   
Widening participation in education may lead to an increase in over-education for 
various reasons.  Employers faced by a more qualified pool of candidates, may have 
upgraded some traditionally non-graduate jobs.  Alternatively they may recruit graduates for 
jobs that have basically stayed the same and do not require graduate skills (qualification 
inflation) or as educational standards are commonly suspected to decrease over-time, upgrade 
their qualification requirements to select candidates with the appropriate skills (grade-drift).  
(See Berg, 1970 or Robinson and Manacorda, 1996 for empirical evidence concerning the 
UK.)  Moreover, the increased participation in tertiary education has depleted the pool of 
well-qualified 16 year old school leavers, thus employers may consider low ability graduates 
as an adequate substitute2. 
                                                                 
1 See also Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000) for a meta-analysis of the effect of over-education on the 
returns to education. 
2 Employers may benefit from spillover effects if over-educated workers provide their less qualified workmates 
with some informal training. 
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Widening the access to higher education has increased the heterogeneity of the skills 
of the new graduates entering the labour market3.  Hence, previous measures of over-
education may have overestimated the true extent of the phenomenon, as some graduates are 
not endowed with the skills required to obtain a graduate job (see also Mason, 1999) for 
evidence on the lack of skills of some chemistry graduates).  Thus, a division of over-
educated workers between apparently over-educated and genuinely over-educated is 
proposed and tested by comparing the training opportunities and wages of the different 
groups of graduates defined.  
In case of a non-optimal match employers should provide more training to over-
educated workers to bring their skills in line with the requirement of the job (Van Eijs and 
Heijke, 1997).  This would be the case when the mismatch is minor, i.e. for apparently over-
educated workers.  Alternatively, human capital theory predicts that over-educated workers 
are less likely to get training as they compensate their lack of specific skills by an excess of 
education.  Also, over-educated workers might have shorter tenure since they keep looking 
for a better match, therefore firms are less likely to invest in their training.  This type of 
worker is genuinely over-educated.  Hence, apparently over-educated workers receive more 
employer-funded training than genuinely over-educated workers do.  The skill differential 
generates a difference in the productivity of the different types of graduates.  Hence, the 
earnings of an over-educated graduate are bound to be lower than those received by matched 
workers; furthermore I anticipate the genuinely over-educated to earn the least. 
 
 
2.  Definitions of Over-Education 
 
In the Seventies, a surge in the number of graduates in the US triggered the first research on 
the demand for graduates in the labour force (Berg, 1970; Freeman, 1976).  Freeman 
concluded that as the excess qualified workforce has to settle for jobs that “do not require a 
degree”, the returns to education should plummet.  Lower returns should reduce the 
investment in higher education and henceforth the labour market should return to an 
equilibrium point.  Freeman’s prediction never materialised as returns to education remained 
high, however, participation in college dropped in the seventies (Card and Lemieux, 2000).  
Similarly, in the UK, despite the recent evidence that between 29% and 47% of the work-
force is over-educated (Green et al., 1999), returns to education have remained stable 
between 1978 and 1996 (Chevalier and Walker, 1999), implying that the demand for skills 
kept up with the supply4.   
In this model of supply and demand, over-education is only due to a temporary dis-
equilibrium; however, empirical evidence rejects this scenario, as over-education appears to 
be a permanent feature of the economy.  Moreover, a large proportion of over-educated 
workers tend to remain in a mismatched situation.  Dolton and Vignoles (1997), analysing the 
                                                                 
3 Two factors are at play.  First, pupils with lower ability have had access to higher education.  I assume that 
some of these students with lower initial ability will not acquire as many skills as traditional students during 
their degree.  Second, the increased number of students associated with a reduction of the available funding has 
put strain on universities:  student-staff ratios have increased dramatically especially in tutorial and other lab 
classes.  This reduced support is likely to have affected the ability of students to acquire knowledge (See Mason, 
1999 for evidence). 
4 University attendance in the UK declined for the first time in 1998, but this is likely to be due to the 
introduction of university tuition fees (£1,000 per year). 
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early careers of a cohort of 1980 UK graduates, find that 62% of male graduates, who were 
over-educated in their first job, remained in a sub-graduate position six years after 
graduation.  Also, Sloane et al. (1999) report no evidence that the quality of the match 
improves with the change of employer. 
These facts appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that the graduate population is 
not homogeneous in its skill endowment.  Some graduates have developed qualities that make 
them suitable for a graduate job whereas others appear to lack these skills5.  One can assume 
that the recent expansion in the number of pupils going to university has been associated with 
a greater heterogeneity in the skills of graduates.  A large heterogeneity in the skills of 
graduates is in accordance with the persistence of over-education and non-promotion of over-
educated workers (over-educated workers are trapped at the end of the job-search queue).  
Most of the literature has ignored the issue of educational heterogeneity by defining over-
education as departing from a norm6, and assuming the homogeneity in skills of all workers 
with an identical qualification, therefore overestimating the extent of over-education.   
Empirical work relies on three definitions of over-education.  First, one’s education is 
compared to the self-assessed qualification required to perform one’s job7.  Second, an 
“expert” definition of educational requirement for a given occupation is used.  Third, the 
distribution of education is calculated for each occupation; employees who depart from the 
mean or median by more than some ad hoc value (generally one standard deviation) are 
classified as over-educated.  These definitions of over-education suffer from major 
drawbacks.   
Using self-assessment to define the job’s educational requirements adjusts the 
measure of over-education to the specific skills needed for the job and should provide a 
precise measure.  However, this definition of over-education relies on employees accurately 
reporting the skills required for their job.  Also and more importantly, this measure relies on 
the ability of an employee to match a specific level of skills with a qualification level.  
Additionally, employees might report the current hiring standards, which in the presence of 
qualification inflation or grade drift will bias the over-education measure upward. 
The “expert” definition of the job requirement avoids the bias due to self-reporting.  
However, the information collected might not be up to date with a rapidly changing work 
environment.  Also, this measure is based on the job title, and therefore does not account for 
the task-specificity of the individual’s position. 
The statistical definition of over-education is the least desirable.  As it is based on the 
observed distribution of education for a given occupation, it is sensitive to cohort effects, 
especially in the case of a rapid change in the educational level required to perform in a given 
occupation.  Also, the measure is sensitive to the level of aggregation that is necessary to 
obtain a reliable distribution of education; the higher the aggregation, the less occupation-
specific the measure is.  Finally, this measure defines over-education as belonging to the 
                                                                 
5 See Green et al.(1999) and Mason (1999) for evidence on the lack of “appropriate” skills among over-educated 
workers. 
6 Robst (1995) includes ability and institution quality measures and finds that US graduates with higher ability 
and from more prestigious institutions are less likely to be overeducated and more likely to exit from an over-
education spell.  
7 See Green et al. (1999) for a discussion on the difference between measures of over-qualification relying on 
the qualification “to do” and qualification “to get“ a job; the empirical evidence provided is inconclusive vis-a-
vis a significant difference between the two measures.  The lack of difference between the qualifications 
required “to do” and “to get” a job casts doubt on the qualification inflation hypothesis. 
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upper tail of the education distribution.  Defining over-education as departing from more than 
one standard deviation from the mean, results in finding similar proportions of over and 
under educated workers:  around 15% of the population if education is measured in years and 
the distribution of education per occupation is normally distributed (Hartog, 1997). 
All these measures of over-education rely on the assumption that all individuals with 
a given education level are perfect substitutes.  Even in the UK, where a degree is mostly the 
“open sesame” to employers’ graduate training schemes, this assumption would be far 
fetched8.  The last two measures also imply that all jobs within a given occupation require 
identical skills.  These two assumptions are obviously naïve in an economy where graduates 
are hired for their task-flexibility (Halaby, 1994).  
I propose an alternative measure of over-education based on a measure of the job 
satisfaction9:  “ How dis/satisfied are you with the match between your work and your 
qualifications?”  The possible answers to this question are grouped into 6 categories ranging 
from very dissatisfied to very satisfied.  A bad-match dichotomous variable is generated by 
grouping the very dissatisfied and dissatisfied answers.  One advantage of this definition of 
mismatch is that it refers to qualifications, not only education, and does not require an 
assessment of the educational level required to do the same job.  Hence it acknowledges 
Halaby’s (1994) criticisms that, individuals with a given education level are not always inter-
changeable and that a given occupation may require different skills from each individual.  
However, as the satisfaction measure is defined as a dichotomous variable, the extent of the 
mismatch cannot be calculated10.   
It can be argued that this definition does not measure over-education accurately.  
First, the dissatisfaction between qualification and occupation could be due to under-
education.  However, as the population of interest is composed of young graduates only, the 
extent of under-education is likely to be limited.  Second, the dissatisfaction could reflect that 
despite being in a graduate job, this occupation is not related to the academic subject studied 
at university.  Third, the job may require most of the skills that were learnt at university but 
also some more from a different field.  For example General Practitioners (Medical Doctors) 
are likely to require some financial skills in order to run their fund-holding practice11.  Hence 
despite the apparent good match, some graduates may report dissatisfaction in the match 
between education and occupation.  These criticisms are answered in Section 3. 
 
 
3.  Satisfaction as a Measure of Over-Education 
 
Let us assume that two types of graduates exist:  type g are the clever and type l are the plain 
graduates.  Graduates have perfect information about their quality.  When graduates enter the 
labour market, employers can assess their type, for example by looking at their degree results 
                                                                 
8 Borghans and Smits (1997) show that in the Netherlands, 22% of graduates from higher vocational education 
work outside their field of study.  Appropriately educated working outside their field of study suffer from a pay 
penalty of 3% compared to their peers.  
9 Since the writing of this paper, it came to my attention that Battu et al. (2000) use a similar definition of over-
education based on the satisfaction of the match between education and job. 
10 A separation between dissatisfied and very dissatisfied workers could provide some measures of the degree of 
over-education.  However, only 6.1% of graduates referred to themselves as being very dissatisfied about the 
match between their education and their job, which would lead to a small sample size. 
11 I thank Peter Dolton for pointing out this example. 
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or institution.  Let us also assume that there are three types of jobs that graduates can apply 
for:  graduate jobs (G), intermediate jobs requiring some graduate skills (U) and jobs 
demanding lower academic skills (L).  Two queues of graduates looking for jobs are formed 
according to their endowment in skills.  The possible outcomes for a match are presented in 
the following table. 
 
  
Skilled graduate 
 
Less skilled graduate 
 
 
Graduate job 
 
Perfect Match (Gg) 
 
X 
Upgraded job Genuine Over-education (Ug) Apparent Over-education (Ul) 
Non graduate job X Genuine Over-education  (Ll) 
   
 
Skilled graduates compete for graduate jobs, most of them obtain a graduate job; this 
is a perfect match (Gg).  However, skilled graduates at the end of the queue might only be 
offered upgraded jobs (Ug) and hence be genuinely over-educated12. Less skilled graduates 
are not offered graduate jobs, and they compete for upgraded jobs (Ul). In most of the 
literature, this type of match is defined as a mismatch, as the worker appears to be over-
educated for the position.  However, due to the low standard of skill of l-graduates, this type 
of match can be considered as appropriate. The less able from that group can only get a non-
graduate job (Ul) and are genuinely over-educated.  In this framework, skilled graduates in an 
upgraded job and less skilled graduates in a non-graduate job feel that their skills are under-
used and they are defined as genuinely over-educated whereas less skilled graduates in an 
upgraded job are apparently over-educated.  With time, genuinely over-educated graduates 
might be able to move into a “perfect match” job if they are g-type or an “upgraded job” if 
they are the l-type.  However, apparently over-educated graduates will not be able to move to 
a “perfect match” position as they lack some essential “graduate skills”.  Therefore, a bulk of 
the graduate population will appear to remain over-educated, as observed by Dolton and 
Vignoles (1997).  This model appears to be an appropriate representation of the graduate 
employment pattern described by Mason (1996).  Over-education has been previously over-
estimated since “genuine” and “apparent” over-education were not distinguished.   
By combining the expert and satisfaction definitions, it is possible to separate the 
graduate populations according to this framework.  As mentioned at the end of Section 2, the 
satisfaction definition may not be appropriate; by combining it with the expert definition, 
these criticisms can be answered.  All graduates who are in graduate jobs are defined as 
matched, whatever their satisfaction.  Hence, graduates who are in a graduate job that does 
not match their subject of study are defined as adequately educated even if they claim to be 
dissatisfied.  Similarly, to finish with the example of medical doctors requiring financial 
skills to do their job effectively, they would be classified as adequately educated, as ‘doctor’ 
is a graduate occupation.  The graduate population is separated into three groups.  Graduates 
in graduate jobs (Gg), as defined by their occupation (expert definition) form the control 
group.  Only graduates who are not in graduate jobs are split between those who are satisfied 
(Ul) and those who are not satisfied (Ug and Ll) with the match between their education and 
their occupation. 
                                                                 
12 Lack of mobility or information of some graduates (women, new entrant) could also lead to a similar 
outcome. 
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4.  Data 
 
To conduct this study, a sample of two cohorts of UK graduates is used.  The data was 
collected by a postal survey organised by the University of Birmingham in the winter of 1996 
among graduates from 30 higher education institutions covering the range of UK institutions 
(see Belfield et al., 1997 for details).  Graduates from the 1985 and 1990 cohorts were 
selected, leading to a sample of 18,000 individuals.  Graduates from the Open University and 
the University of Buckingham were dropped due to the different profile of their graduates13.  
Furthermore, graduates who were older than 25 on graduation, self employed or disabled 
were dropped as these characteristics might affect their satisfaction.  The questionnaire 
covers a wide range of topics, including schooling, academic information, family background 
and employment history.  Of particular use for this paper is the section on the satisfaction 
about the match between education and employment.  Additionally, this survey has some 
longitudinal component as respondents were asked about their employment situation at three 
points in time:  one year, six years and, in for the older cohort, 11 years after graduation.  
This data allows a comparison of three different measures of over-education.  First, 
the “expert” measure is based on a definition of graduate jobs proposed by Alpin et al. 
(1998).  Using the Standard Occupation Code (2-digit), the following occupations are defined 
as graduate jobs:  all types of managers and professionals, plus computer analysts from the 
associate professional category.  Second, as in Battu et al. (1999) over-qualification is 
defined by using the answers to the following question:  “Was your degree a requirement in 
the job specification for your main employment?”  The recoding into a binary variable 
follows these authors’ recommendations14.  Third, the proposed measure of educational 
mismatch based on satisfaction is computed:  dissatisfied workers are defined as being over-
educated.  (The expert and satisfaction definitions are used separately.) 
These definitions result in various measures of the extent of over-education in the UK 
graduate population that are presented in Table 1.  The ‘expert’ definition of job-match leads 
to estimates of over education ranging from 13% to 21.5%; 10 percentage points lower than 
found by Alpin et al. (1998) who were using a sub-sample of graduates extracted from the 
Labour Force Survey15 (1995).  The difference may stem from cohort effects.  The most 
commonly used measure of over-education is based on job requirement; which level of 
education is needed to “get” or “do” the job.  Focusing on recent studies dealing with 
graduate over-education, the job requirement measure has lead to estimates of mismatch 
ranging from 30% to 41% (Dolton and Vignoles, 1997 and Battu et al., 1999).  The results, 
using the ‘degree requirement measure’, lie on the lower part of this interval.  The 
satisfaction definition leads to results similar to those obtained with the expert definition.  
Over-education ranges from 12% to 20%.  The younger males (females) are 7 (3) percentage 
points more likely to report a mismatch between their education and their job than their older 
peers.  Evidence of gender and cohort differences in the likelihood of over-education are 
unclear. 
                                                                 
13 The Open University is a distance learning centre and Buckingham University is a private university. 
14 Our results differ significantly from theirs as we restrict the population to graduates who were less than 25 on 
graduation, employed in 1996 and provided information on their earnings.   
15 The Labour Force Survey is a nationally representative survey of the UK population (150,000 individuals) 
conducted quarterly. 
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The three definitions of over-education provide various estimates of the extent of 
over-education in the graduate population.  According to these figures, between 13% and 
33% of the UK graduates are over-educated.  The expert and satisfaction definitions result in 
the lowest over-education rate (around 18%), whereas the commonly used educational 
requirement definition generates a level of over-education 15 percentage points higher.  This 
large difference indicates that employers do not always indicate the educational requirement 
that is truly necessary to perform the job, or, as Battu et al. (1999) stress, that a degree is not 
always a formal requirement for a graduate job, especially for managerial positions.  It is also 
of interest to measure whether these various definitions of over-education define a similar 
group of graduates.  Table 2 reports the proportion of the population that is classified in 
identical categories when using any combination of two definitions of over-education.  
Between 65% and 80% of the population is classified identically when using any two 
measures.  The highest correlation is obtained when using the satisfaction and the expert 
definitions. 
The extent of over-education appears to depend drastically on the definition used.  By 
pooling the expert and satisfaction definitions, as recommended in Section 3, three groups of 
graduates are defined:  matched, apparently and genuinely overeducated.  The two cohorts of 
graduates are pooled leading to a sample size of 5552 observations.  Graph 1 reports the 
distribution of answers to the following question:  “On reflection and in general, in what 
ways has your degree contributed to you getting an interesting job?”  The answers were 
reported on a 6 level scale from not at all, to a lot.  It is expected that graduates in an 
upgraded position are somehow, positive about the contribution of their degree, whereas 
graduates in a low skill job should be much more critical. 
The distribution of answer for matched and apparently over-educated graduates is 
similar.  The mode answer for these two categories is 5, reflecting a high satisfaction in the 
contribution of the degree into getting an interesting job.  Apparently over-educated are 
slightly less satisfied than matched workers, which would confirm that they are in jobs 
requiring some graduate skills.  On the other hand, genuinely over-educated workers are 
highly dissatisfied with the contribution of their degree.  More than 50% admit that their 
degree did not contribute to getting an interesting job.  Genuinely and apparently 
overeducated graduates are typically in jobs that have different requirement regarding the use 
of graduate skills.  Hence, the separation of the over-educated population into two types 
seems appropriate. 
Table 3 reports the mean characteristics for the three groups of graduates defined. In 
the sample, 18% of employed graduates are not in a graduate job.  However, two thirds of the 
over-educated graduates are only apparently over-educated and only 6% of the overall 
graduate population can be defined as genuinely over-educated.  Over-education is more 
likely to affect graduates from the younger cohort than the older one.  Three hypotheses could 
explain this difference.  First, older workers have had more time to prospect the labour 
market and acquire, through on-the-job-training, some of the skills they were originally 
missing.  Second, workers might revise their career expectations with time and accept their 
situation as inevitable.  Third, it may be that graduates from the younger cohort were less 
likely to acquire graduate skills while studying due to over-crowding or changes in the 
curriculum.  Unfortunately, these conflicting hypotheses cannot be tested with this data.  
Women are more likely than men to accept non-graduate jobs.  Married women might 
be more constrained in their job search by family preferences and hence are more likely to be 
over-educated (Frank, 1978 and Battu, Seaman and Sloane, 1998 for empirical evidence 
concerning the UK). 
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Respondents in graduate jobs possess better credentials than over-educated graduates.  
Depending on the repartition of genuinely over-educated workers between good graduates in 
an upgraded job (Ug) and plain graduates in a low-skill position (Ll), this group will on 
average have better or worst grades than the apparently over-educated.  Genuinely over-
educated appear to have been the least successful at school (A-level score) and university, 
hence it can be assumed that most of them are plain graduates working in a low skilled job.  
This supports the idea that the demand for g-type graduates is not sizeably smaller than its 
supply, thus over-education does not stem from a dis-equilibrium in the market for graduates 
but from the lack of skills of some graduates. 
Genuinely over-educated workers receive the least training, 28% claim to have 
received work related training in the past 4 weeks; this proportion is respectively 43% and 
40% for employees in graduate jobs and apparently over-educated graduates.  Similarly, 
substantial pay differentials are observed between the three groups of graduates.  Pay per 
hour is computed for respondents reporting working at least 10 hours a week16. Graph 2 
reports the pay distribution for the three categories of graduates. The distribution of earnings 
for matched and apparently over-educated workers has a similar form; the distribution of pay 
per hour for workers in a graduate job has a heavier upper tail.  On the other hand, the 
distribution for genuinely over-educated workers lies to the left of the previous two.  
Graduates in a graduate occupation earn a median pay of £10.33 per hour.  The pay 
penalty reaches 10% for being apparently over-educated and 33% for being genuinely over-
educated.  This large pay differential indicates that genuinely over-educated graduates are 
likely to be of the less-skilled type settling for jobs that have not been upgraded.  
Additionally, the decomposition of the pay distribution per decile (not reproduced here) 
reveals that for all decile, matched and apparently over-educated workers earn substantially 
more than genuinely over-educated workers. 
 
 
5.  Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1  Over-education and training 
 
Genuinely and apparently over-educated graduates differ in the amount of training that they 
receive from their employers.  The former compensates their lack of job-specific skills by 
their excess of generic skills, whereas the latter needs to acquire job-specific skills.  Training 
is self-reported in the survey, and for the analysis a dichotomous variable based on the 
answer to the following question:  “Over the last four weeks have you taken part in any 
education or training connected with your work?” is created. 
First, the determinants of training are estimated for all graduates by a probit; results 
are reproduced in Table 4.  The exogeneous variables include dummies for faculty (11 
dummies, the omitted faculty being social sciences), type of higher education institution (pre-
1992, UK higher education was divided between Universities and Polytechnics, the former 
being more academic), three post-graduate qualifications (Masters, Ph.D., professional), A-
level score, degree grade17, and various employment characteristics.   
                                                                 
16 Only grouped annual earnings are available.  We use midpoints (arbitrarily fixed at £60,000 for the category 
£50,000 and above), and divide them by the full year equivalent of the usual weekly hours worked. 
17 UK graduates receive grades ranging from First, upper Second, Lower Second, Third, and Pass.  A few 
institutions do not grade the results.  First and upper Second are typically the requirement for a graduate job.  
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Institution effects on labour outcome may exist, thus in an initial step, dummies for 
the institution attended were included.  Results were inconclusive as the number of 
observations per cell was drastically reduced.  As a substitute the standard errors are 
corrected to account for some possible correlation in the non-observable characteristics of 
individuals attending the same higher education institution.  The subject of degree 
significantly affects the likelihood of being trained; sciences, administration and language 
graduates obtain less training than social scientists, whereas graduates from education are 
12% more likely to get some.  Graduates with a professional qualification or a PhD, working 
in a medium size firm, with a permanent contract and a union representation get the most 
training especially if they have never been unemployed.  When these covariates are 
introduced, no cohort or gender effect is observable.  Graduates who are apparently over-
educated for their job, get as much training as those in a graduate job (base category).  On the 
other hand, graduates who are genuinely over-educated are nearly 12% less likely to have 
been trained in the last four weeks.  The marked difference in the training obtained by the two 
groups of over-educated graduates confirms the assumption that over-educated workers 
cannot be treated as a homogeneous population.  Employers provide more training to 
apparently over-educated workers in order to improve their productivity; as proposed by Van 
Eijs and Heijke (1997).  On the other hand, genuinely over-educated workers, trapped in low-
skill occupations, do not require training; they may compensate their lack of specific skills 
with formal education. 
Over-education may stem from lack of information concerning the labour market 
(Jovanovic, 1979), or long term promotion strategy18 (Sloane et al., 1999).  The realisation of 
these events is more likely for the younger workers.  Additionally, Frank (1978) proposes that 
married women might be constrained in their choice of employers by their familial 
responsibilities.  Therefore, interaction terms between gender, cohort and over-education type 
are added to the previous specification.  The inclusion of these interactions has no significant 
impact on the estimates.  All interaction terms are insignificant and the only change in the 
other independent variables is that males in a graduate job are found to be significantly less 
trained than females, which may come from gender differences in occupational choice 
(teaching and nursing are associated with high training opportunities, sometime compulsory, 
and are typically female occupations).  Significant differences in access to employer training 
exist between genuinely over-educated and apparently over-educated workers.  The former 
are 12% less likely than matched graduates to be trained, whereas no difference between 
apparently over-educated and matched workers is found.   
 
5.2  Over-education and earnings 
 
The effect of over-education on earnings has been widely documented.  Previous research has 
generally found that the larger the spread between education obtained and education required 
the greater the pay penalty.  Dolton and Vignoles (2000) estimate the pay penalty for over-
educated graduates to range between 4% and 17%.  Battu et al. (1999) estimate an average 
over-education penalty for graduates six years after graduation ranging from 11% to 17%. 
Log hourly pay is estimated using the same exogeneous variables as for the training 
regression. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Hence, dummies for these two grades are entered in the regression. 
18 Employees accept a position for which they are overeducated, as they expect that having a “foot in the door” 
will increase their likelihood of obtaining, in the future, a position for which they are appropriately qualified. 
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ln( )w X S Oi x i s i o i i= + + +b b b e      (1) 
 
In this case, S is a set of post-graduate qualifications, O is vector of dummies defining 
over-education and X is a vector of job and personal characteristics.  e captures unobservable 
idiosyncratic characteristics and the subscript i refers to the individual. 
Graduates from biology, agriculture, architecture, language and humanity earn 
substantially less than social science graduates whereas math students earn more.  The quality 
of education is also associated with higher wages as a higher A-level score, degree grade and 
a degree from a University as opposed to a polytechnic are positively rewarded.  Pay 
increases with tenure, firm size and having a permanent contract, decreases with length of 
unemployment, working in the public sector and union representation.  Variations in 
experience are limited within cohort and experience is not found to be a significant 
determinant of pay.  Marital status and gender also have the expected effect on pay.   
First, in order to offer a comparison with previous studies on the effect of over-
education on earnings, a single dummy for not being in a graduate job is included.  A pay 
penalty of 13% is estimated, in line with previous estimates.  The pay penalty compared to 
matched graduates is estimated at 7% and 26% for respectively apparently and genuinely 
over-educated graduates.  In the third column of Table 5, results with the gender and cohort 
interaction terms are reported.  The interaction terms have the expected sign, females and 
younger workers are more penalised for their over-education but these are not statistically 
significant.  The addition of these interaction terms does not affect the conclusion about the 
effect of over-education on pay.  The pay penalty for being over-educated is estimated at 33% 
for the genuinely over-educated and 6% for the apparently over-educated.  The large 
difference observed in pay between the two groups of over-educated workers reinforces the 
view that the over-educated worker group cannot be considered to be homogeneous.  
Moreover, gender and cohort do not affect the pay penalty for being over-educated, which 
confirm the previous literature (see the meta-analysis of Groot and Maasen van den Brink, 
2000).   
Returns to a degree in the UK are typically in the range 30% to 50% (Chevalier and 
Walker, 1999; Blundell et al., 2000).  Thus, genuinely overeducated graduates suffer from a 
pay penalty compared to other graduates that nearly wipes out all returns from a degree.  This 
is an important consideration to keep in mind as the debate on the increase of university fees 
has recently surged (Greenaway and Haynes, 2000). 
 
5.3  Skills differential 
 
This method of estimating the pay penalty for being over-educated is based on the underlying 
assumption that all graduates are similar in their skills, where skills also include motivation 
and other unobservable characteristics affecting productivity.  Assuming that over-educated 
workers are somehow less skilled than matched workers then the estimated pay differential 
for being over-educated is biased upwards as it includes returns to skills specific to the better 
group of graduates.  Formally, e i in (1) partly measures the endowment in unobservable (to 
the econometrician) skills.  Since skills and over-education are correlated, the estimates of bo 
is equal to: 
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To overcome this difficulty a measure of these unobservables is needed.  The 
longitudinal structure of the data is used.  Earnings one-year after graduation are estimated.  
The residuals of this equation approximate the unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics 
affecting the workers’ productivity.  This measure of individual characteristics is then 
introduced as an exogeneous variable when estimating current earnings.  The estimated 
equation has then the following form: 
 
 ln( )w X S O Ai x i s i o i A i i= + + + +b b b b h     (3) 
 
where Ai is a proxy for the individual unobservable skills.  The over-education dummy and h 
are now independent, which guarantee the unbiasness of bo. 
Graduates who were matched in their first job are excluded, as their first-job earnings 
reflect the perfect match and are not comparable with those of mismatched workers. Only 
graduates from the 1990 cohort who were not in a graduate job during their first year in the 
labour force are kept.  The base category is defined as graduates who made the transition to a 
graduate job by 1996 when they are observed.  Dolton and Vignoles (1997) show that there is 
no stigma to over-education; graduates who made the transition to a graduate job have the 
same earnings profile afterwards than graduates who never were over-educated.  Hence 
graduates who made the transition to a graduate job are equivalent in their endowment of 
skills to graduates who never were over-educated.  Thus, the skill differential measured by 
this method is an approximation of the skill differential between g-graduates and l-graduates. 
With all these exclusions, the sample size drops to 815 over-educated graduates.  By 
1996, 48% made the transition to a graduate job, 32% are apparently over-educated and 20% 
are genuinely over-educated.  These figures are in range with Dolton and Vignoles’ (1997) 
results on a population of 1980 graduates.  Annual earnings in 1991 are grouped into 16 
categories, band-midpoints define the annual earnings of the individual.  As hours are also 
grouped, log annual earnings are estimated with a dummy for full-time employment among 
other exogeneous variables covering the human capital and labour characteristics of the 
individual in 1991.  This specification explains 26% of the variation in pay in the first job.  
The main determinants are job specific as the sample is rather homogeneous in educational 
attainment.  The residuals from this equation are used to calculate a z-score that is used as a 
proxy for skills and introduced as a covariate in the current pay regression. 
For each individual, the z-score is a measure of the skills differential to the average 
skills for individuals with the same observable characteristics.  This term is positive and 
significant19, indicating that less talented individuals suffer from a substantial pay penalty 
(see Table 6).  A skills differential of one standard deviation reduces current earnings by 
10%.  The inclusion of the proxy for idiosyncratic skills has the expected effect on the 
penalty for being over-educated. Genuinely over-educated workers pay is reduced by 19%, 
whereas apparently over-educated workers do not suffer from any wage penalty when 
unobserved characteristics are accounted for.  However, as unobservable personal attributes 
not only affect earnings but also the probability of being over-educated, interaction terms 
between idiosyncratic qualities, as measured by the z-score, and the dummies for over-
                                                                 
19 As the skill proxy variable is estimated, its inclusion in the wage regression leads to biased standard errors.  
The reported standard errors are estimated by bootstrap with 1000 replications (Efron, 1979). 
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education are also included.  This specification presented in the second column of Table 6 
leads to a similar conclusion.  The penalty for being genuinely over-educated remains at 18%, 
the effect of lower skills is reduced to a pay penalty of 7.5% for one standard deviation, and 
genuinely over-educated workers with skills one standard deviation lower than the average 
are paid 7.5% less than other genuinely over-educated workers.  When their skills are 
accounted for, workers in an upgraded job do not suffer from any pay penalty compared to 
their peers in a graduate job.   
The skills differential explains 30% to 40% of the earnings differential between 
genuinely over-educated and matched graduates and the whole pay gap between apparently 
over-educated and matched graduates.  Therefore, previous research that did not account for 
the skills differential within the graduate population has overestimated the effect of over-
education on earnings. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
Graduates, even with similar qualifications are not homogeneous in their endowment of 
skills.  This variation in talent has led to an over-estimation of the extent and effect of over-
education on earnings in previous research.  The group of graduates traditionally defined as 
over-educated can be divided between apparently and genuinely over-educated.  The 
apparently over-educated group has slightly lower opportunities to improve its human capital 
and is paid nearly 6% less than well-matched graduates.  However, this pay penalty 
disappears when a measure of ability is introduced.  On the other hand, genuinely over-
educated graduates have a reduced probability of getting training (-12%) and suffer from a 
pay penalty reaching 33% compared to the reference group.   
Alternatively, one could argue that the causality could be reversed:  workers with 
lower pay and reduced training opportunities are more likely to report over-education.  
However, genuine over-education appears to be associated with a lack of skills.  30 to 40% of 
the pay differential can be explained by the lower amount of skills of this group compared to 
their peers in a graduate occupation.  The reduced skills could explain lower earnings and the 
lack of training opportunities and thus reject the reverse causality assumption. 
As a large number of graduates do not seem to be able to acquire “graduate” skills 
while at university, it is worth pondering whether mis-skilled graduates best satisfy 
employers’ needs for employees with intermediate skills or whether employees with more 
vocational qualifications would be more appropriate.  The mis-qualification of the workforce 
is costly for the society and for the individuals; with a pay penalty reaching 30%, returns to a 
degree are close to zero (see Blundell et al., 2000).  However, a degree can be viewed as a 
signalling device.  In the absence of alternative vocational qualifications, individuals with 
sub-graduate qualities may make a rational choice by going to university in order to reveal 
their characteristics and obtain an upgraded job.  Also, over-education may reduce the 
likelihood or the length of unemployment compared to less educated workers.  For the less 
able graduates, a degree is an expensive way to provide a signal.  The provision of less 
academic tertiary qualifications would lead to a more cost-efficient sorting. 
This paper does not focus on the determinants of over-education, but as over-
education relates to skill differentiation, it will be interesting to study the effect of university 
quality and field of study on the likelihood of over-education and exit rate from over-
education.  This issue has been explored by Robst (1995) in the US and partly by Mason 
(1999) in the UK.  The large increase in the intake of students that took place since the mid-
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eighties in the UK was associated with a reduction of the cost per student.  This may have 
lead to less personal attention being given to student, and contributed to the increase in the 
heterogeneity in the skills of graduates.  Over-education might also stem from the irrelevance 
of the university curriculum vis-a-vis the job market or the choice of subjects made by the 
students.  Additionally, extra-curriculum activities might reduce the likelihood of over-
education by acting as a signal for non-academic skills.   
Finally, a substantial proportion of the surveyed population reported being dissatisfied 
with their education-job match despite being in a graduate job.  The effect that this 
dissatisfaction may have on apparently well-matched graduates’ productivity, career 
development and earnings profile should be worth exploring.  It could also indicate that 
dissatisfaction about the match between education and occupation measures more than over-
education. 
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Graph 1:  Contribution of Your Degree in Getting an Interesting Job 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2:  Distribution of Pay Per Hour by Over-Education Group 
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 Table 1:  Measures of Over-Education, in Percentage 
 
 Not in graduate 
occupation 
Degree not a 
requirement 
Not satisfied with 
the match 
job/qualification 
Observations 1 
Male cohort 85 13.00 33.83 12.73 1277 (1257) 
Male cohort 90 18.88 33.82 20.02 1780 (1748) 
Female cohort 85 14.68 30.87 14.42 988 (964) 
Female cohort 90 21.57 30.93 17.44 1924 (1864) 
1:  The sample size for the match job/qualifications is smaller due to some missing values on that variable.  The 
sample size for this variable is reported in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Proportion Similarly Defined Between Measures of Over-Education 
 
  Graduate job Job requirement 
  Cohort 
1985 
Cohort 
1990 
Cohort 
1985 
Cohort 
1990 
Job 
requirement 
Male 67.3 72.0   
 Female 71.7 72.2   
Satisfaction Male 79.4 75.7 65.6 70.2 
 Female 80.0 78.4 72.6 73.8 
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Table 3:  Mean and Standard Deviation of Selected Variables 
 
 Well match Genuinely 
over-educated 
Apparently 
over-educated 
Cohort90 0.6061 
(0.4887) 
0.7800 
(0.4148) 
0.6619 
(0.4734) 
Gender 0.5161 
(0.4998) 
0.4457 
(0.4978) 
0.4921 
(0.5003) 
Married 0.4513 
(0.4977) 
0.2714 
(0.4453) 
0.3884 
(0.4878) 
Child number 0.3650 
(0.7357) 
0.2286 
(0.5954) 
0.2972 
(0.6768) 
University 0.6697 
(0.4704) 
0.4771 
(0.5002) 
0.5770 
(0.4944) 
A-level 9.1873 
(4.0655) 
7.4657 
(3.7809) 
8.1069 
(4.0762) 
First 0.0769 
(0.2664) 
0.0400 
(0.1962) 
0.0519 
(0.2220) 
2:1 0.3932 
(0.4885) 
0.3114 
(0.4637) 
0.3616 
(0.4809) 
Employment 85.4265 
(32.3454) 
70.6571 
(28.0742) 
82.6447 
(31.5766) 
Unemployment 2.5463 
(5.8253) 
7.2057 
(9.7691) 
3.9403 
(7.5049) 
Tenure >4 years 0.5056 
(0.5000) 
0.3829 
(0.4868) 
0.4277 
(0.4951) 
Training last month 0.4280 
(0.4948) 
0.2857 
(0.4524) 
0.4009 
(0.4905) 
Pay per hour 11.2429 
(4.7800) 
7.6015 
(3.6947) 
10.1255 
(4.5870) 
Size 25-99 0.1965 
(0.3974) 
0.1457 
(0.3533) 
0.1903 
(0.3928) 
Size 99 or more 0.6600 
(0.4738) 
0.6771 
(0.4682) 
0.6698 
(0.4707) 
Union 0.3078 
(0.4616) 
0.2571 
(0.4377) 
0.2248 
(0.4178) 
Public sector 0.3575 
(0.4793) 
0.3171 
(0.4660) 
0.2657 
(0.4421) 
Observations 4566 350 636 
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Table 4:  Probit- Training in the Last 4 Weeks 
 
 Marginal effect z-value Marginal effect z-value 
Genuine Over education -0.1172 
(0.0303) 
-3.65 -0.1261 
(0.0530) 
-2.22 
Apparent over education -0.0023 
(0.0319) 
-0.07 -0.0453 
(0.0646) 
-0.69 
Man* genuine over ed.   0.0039 
(0.0503) 
0.08 
Man* apparent over ed.   0.0738 
(0.0407) 
1.83 
Cohort90* genuine over ed.   0.0101 
(0.0771) 
0.13 
Cohort90 * apparent over ed.   0.0116 
(0.0593) 
0.2 
Cohort90 -0.0185 
(0.0554) 
-0.33 -0.0211 
(0.0555) 
-0.38 
Male -0.0256 
(0.0141) 
-1.81 -0.0343 
(0.0164) 
-2.09 
     
Observations 5552  5552  
Pseudo R2 0.0424  0.0427  
 
Note:  Hubert White standard error and cluster analysis (by type of Higher Education Institutions) 
The regression also includes dummies for faculty, type of HEI, post-graduate qualification, A-level score, 
degree grade, tenure, employer’s size, union, public sector and type of contract.  Also, months of unemployment 
and a quadratic in month of employment are included. 
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Table 5:  OLS Ln Pay Per Hour - All Graduates 
 
 Specification 0 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Over-education -0.1340 
(0.0146) 
  
Genuine Over education  -0.2595 
(0.0195) 
-0.3371 
(0.0456) 
Apparent over education  -0.0699 
(0.0148) 
-0.0623 
(0.0361) 
Man* genuine over ed.   0.0214 
(0.0447) 
Man* apparent over ed.   0.0192 
(0.0153) 
Cohort90* genuine over ed.   0.0871 
(0.0570) 
Cohort90 * apparent over ed.   -0.0256 
(0.0383) 
Cohort90 0.0443 
(0.0497) 
0.0416 
(0.0497) 
0.0371 
(0.0479) 
Male 0.0187 
0.0080) 
0.0185 
(0.0078) 
0.0146 
(0.0080) 
Constant 1.7088 
(0.0826) 
1.7302 
(0.0839) 
1.7332 
(0.0848) 
Observations 5552 5552 5552 
R2 0.3781 0.3871 0.3879 
 
Note:  Hubert White standard error and cluster analysis ( by type of HEI) 
The regression also includes dummies for faculty, type of HEI, post-graduate qualification, A-level score, 
degree grade, region, tenure, employer’s size, union, public sector and type of contract.  Also, months of 
unemployment and a quadratic in month of employment are included. 
Bold characters are significant at the 5% level 
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Table 6:  OLS Ln Pay Per Hour 90s Graduates With Mismatched Spell 
 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
Genuine Over education -0.1871 
(0.0300) 
-0.1847 
(0.0306) 
Apparent over education -0.0145 
(0.0233) 
-0.0153 
(0.0254) 
Skill:  z-score 0.1001 
(0.0147) 
0.0747 
(0.0190) 
Skill * genuine ov.ed.  0.0745 
(0.0389) 
Skill * apparent ov.ed.  0.0475 
(0.0358) 
Constant 1.8110 
(0.2309) 
1.8411 
(0.2308) 
Observations 815 815 
R2 0.4004 0.4076 
 
Note:  Standard errors obtained by bootstrap, 1000 replications. 
The regression also includes dummies for faculty, type of HEI, post-graduate qualification, A-level score, 
degree grade, region, tenure, employer’s size, union, public sector and type of contract.  Also, months of 
unemployment and a quadratic in month of employment are included. 
Standard errors not corrected for the inclusion of residuals. 
Bold characters are significant at the 5% level 
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